ABSTRACT The number of applications based on the Android platform is increasing rapidly now. However, as the supervision and review of Android applications are inadequate, a reasonable chance exists that users will download malware. This malware can lead to information leakage, monetary loss, and other damages. At present, a variety of applications exist for detecting malware, but most of these applications cannot show specific malicious behaviors. Moreover, the operation of this detection software is based on the database of viruses, and thus, it cannot identify unknown malware. To solve these problems, we implemented a system to detect the behaviors of Android applications and identify known or unknown malware. Our system can monitor specified applications utilizing loading a kernel module. After the detection process, the related documents are uploaded to the server, and the dynamic behaviors are reconstructed. As a result, a behavior diagram is generated. In addition, if the user needs to know whether the application is malware, the related Android package is sent to the server and analyzed. Then, the server calculates the results and the results are returned to the client.
I. INTRODUCTION
With its rapid development, the Android system has become an operating system that has a wide range of influence worldwide. While it is convenient for users to use diverse applications in life, because of lax review systems, a number of malwares have appeared. According to statistical results [27] , most malware malicious behaviors are related to obtaining root permissions, achieving remote control, and utilizing the Command and Control (C&C) Server, which results in a monetary loss, sensitive information disclosure, and other disadvantages. Thus, the analysis of Android applications has become a hot topic. Currently, three main methods of analyzing applications exist: static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis.
Dynamic analysis detects behaviors of applications by executing them on real machines or simulators. One dynamic analysis method uses a Dalvik virtual machine (VM); however, it cannot detect behaviors in native codes. A second means of implementing dynamic analysis depends on VM introspection [3] , [16] , [22] executed in a simulated environment such as QEMU. These simulated environments own higher-level permissions and are able to achieve a detailed dynamic analysis. However, they have several disadvantages, such as path explosion and incomplete detection results.
Static analysis extracts the required information by means of source code and binary file analyses. In this method, almost all codes can be covered and analyzed without applications being executed. Unfortunately, the challenges of code obfuscation [12] and dynamic code loading [15] may arise. Finally, hybrid analysis, which combines static and dynamic analysis, was invented; however, this method is certainly more complicated.
The results of these analysis methods cannot easily be understood, especially by normal users. Moreover, the execution of professional analysis methods is complicated. Therefore, several malware identification applications were developed for normal users [19] . Although convenient, these applications may not show specific malicious behaviors. Furthermore, some identify applications through a database of known malware, and therefore are unable to identify unknown malware.
In this paper, we apply hybrid analysis in our system to resolve the problems described above. We implement an
Android application to detect, analyze, and identify applications and evaluated it using many sample applications. The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We create a new approach for detecting real-time behaviors based on an Android kernel, which uses kernel-level monitoring mechanisms. 2) We create a new approach for identifying malware using the results of both dynamic detection and static analysis. Then, it is easy to analyze an application according to the statistical results to identify whether it is malware by using a naive Bayesian algorithm. In addition, it is noteworthy that this method can identify both known and unknown software. 3) Our approach analyzes behaviors using a data-centric technique, which differs from the traditional analysis of a single application or the entire system [1] , [14] . The analysis approach presented in this paper is capable of reconstructing the behaviors of multiple applications while incurring less overhead. 4) We implement a complete system with graphical interfaces, which is more convenient to use. Moreover, we present the evaluation of our system in detail. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce the techniques applied in our system and give an overview of the system. The detailed design of the system is presented in Section III. Then, we present the evaluation in Section IV. In Section V, we review and compare related work. Finally, Section VI discusses limitations and future work.
II. OVERVIEW A. TECHNIQUES
Several techniques are applied in our system to manage data storage, network transmission [23] , and the service terminal. MySQL is used to store data, including the permissions and APIs of applications and the probability that selected permissions and APIs are used. Using these data, our system can identify Android applications. Moreover, the small scale and fast speed of MySQL is suitable for our system. The process of identifying applications is executed on the server. To build this, we apply Struts 2, a Web application framework. As compared to Struts 1, Struts 2 is based on WebWork and handles requests using an interceptor mechanism so that it can completely separate the business logic from Servlet.
B. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
An overview of the system of real-time behavior analysis and identification for Android applications is presented in Fig. 1 . The system is composed of six modules, two of which are on the client side and four on the server side. Specifically, on the client side, an Android application is installed that is composed of two modules. The first time the application is run on a device, the required files are initialized. Then, each FIGURE 1. Overview of the system. time the application is opened, additional initialization work is completed. The system loads a kernel module to detect the behaviors of the selected applications, and all behaviors are recorded in the general log file.
Our server is composed of four modules. If required, the dynamic behaviors of an application are reconstructed, and then the behavior graph is generated. The configuration files and codes of an Android application can be acquired by using a decompiler. In addition, relevant content such as permissions and APIs can be extracted from these files. Samples of malicious or benign applications are parsed, and the statistical results for permissions and APIs can be acquired. After feature selection, selected permissions and APIs are used to train a classifier. When it has received an APK, the server analyzes it and utilizes the classifier to identify the application.
III. DETAILED DESIGN A. INITIALIZATION
The initialization module is responsible for generating resource files when the Android application is used for the first time. Specifically, some resource files need to be copied, including all Android interface definition language (AIDL) files and the loadable kernel module [24] , [28] , and some files need to be created, such as the uid_file and directories for log files and behavior graphs.
Nonsystem applications are shown as a list each time the user opens our Android application. PackageManager is used to indicate all applications, and system applications are filtered out. The detailed information of each nonsystem application includes the name of the application, name of the application package, the id of the application, the name of the version, number of the version, installation date, update date, and the icon of the application.
B. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR DETECTION
An important task in the behavior detection module is to add a hook to the kernel to monitor system calls. A loadable kernel module can implement this task. Most operating systems, including Unix and Windows, support the loadable kernel module, and thus it can be used to detect behaviors of applications without recompiling the Linux kernel or restarting the system.
In rootkit.ko, the first step is to obtain sys_call_table, which contains all system calls. When an interrupt or an exception occurs, the kernel jumps to the exception vector table to handle it. In the Linux kernel of the Android system, a section of space ranging from the address of 0xffff0000 represents all interrupt routines, and an instruction, which is stored at the address of 0xffff0008, is able to copy the address of exception handling to the current instruction register. In the process of exception handling, an instruction exists that loads the address of sys_call_table to a register. Therefore, it is feasible to search for the loading instruction in the process of handling, and then find the address of sys_call_table.
After obtaining the address of sys_call_table, specific system calls can be intercepted. The source addresses of required system calls should first be stored and then replaced with the addresses of the handling functions designed in this study. In these handling functions, the original system calls are still called to handle interrupts or exceptions. Four types of system calls are intercepted in our system: Android interprocess communication, file operations, network operations, and process management. Among these system calls, Android interprocess communication can be parsed by Binder Parser, as most of the system calls depend on the Android Binder mechanism; other system calls can be directly parsed using System Call Parser. The two parses are introduced below.
1) BINDER PARSER
The Binder framework is the standardized interprocess communication mechanism. The Binder mechanism consists of four components: Client, Server, Service Manager, and Binder Driver. Client, Server, and Service Manager run in the user space, whereas Binder Driver runs in the kernel space. In addition, in communications, Binder Driver provides /dev/binder, which is a type of device file for communicating with the userspace. At the same time, Client, Server, and Service Manager communicate with Binder Driver by file manipulation functions, including open and ioctl. Finally, Service Manager is used as a daemon for managing Server and providing Client with the capacity to query the interfaces of Server. AIDL is used to implement one-to-one correspondence above in the Android system, as it allows an application to define interfaces between Client and Server. The Android software development kit (SDK) automatically generates a Java interface file when an AIDL file has been completed.
The source function of the ioctl system call is ioctl (unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg). The first parameter represents a file descriptor of one binder device, the second represents the IO control command, and the third represents the content sent in userspace. If the second parameter is BINDER_WRITE_READ, the third must be a BINDER_WRITE_READ structure. In the BINDER_WRITE_READ structure, the member variable ''write_buffer'' records content that is transmitted from the user space to Binder Driver, while the member variable ''read_buffer'' preserves data from Binder Driver in the user space.
Further, ''write_buffer'' is stored as an array, each element of which consists of a communication protocol code and a set of communication data. The communication protocol code BC_TRANSACTION represents communication data between processes; the corresponding structure is binder_transaction_data. The proposed system extracts required information from the two member variables described in the following in the structure of binder_transaction_data.
''Data_buffer_address,'' which stores information from user space, is the first member variable required. The first content in the buffer is the request header. The following VOLUME 6, 2018 content comprises the parameters of the interface, which can be parsed by Server. Contents other than primitive information and contents in Intents are unreadable. Therefore, we directly parse the primitive information of specific functions and information in Intents to gain data in the buffer.
The second member variable is ''function_feature_code,'' which matches the function in the AIDL file. The Android SDK may generate some constants according to rules when compiling the AIDL file. These constants are stored at member variable ''code,'' and Server searches for the corresponding function through the constants. To parse ''code,'' it is necessary to parse the AIDL files in advance for interfaces. In this system, the AIDL files are parsed automatically and stored in memory. In addition, some bound services such as ActivityManager and ContentProvider are services themselves, and thus we convert them into AIDL files artificially.
2) SYSTEM CALL PARSER
System calls of file operations contain mainly open, read, write, and close, and parameter parsing is aimed at file descriptors. To improve the performance, we apply a hash table to store file descriptors that have been parsed. Furthermore, some file operations are triggered by an application itself; these are probably operations on processes, device files, and class libraries. In this system, file operations on /proc, /dev, /vendor/lib, and /system/lib are not recorded to avoid future influence on the behavior reconstruction.
For network operations, we choose to record the data, sources, and destinations that are transmitted. For system calls of sendto and recvfrom, attention should be paid to the first three parameters. In detail, the first parameter is the file descriptor of the socket and is used to record the IP addresses and port numbers of sources and destinations. The second represents the data to be sent or received, and the third specifies the length of the data.
All system calls are eventually recorded in a general file in the format [Rootkit] (process id) (application id) system call (parameter 1, . . ., parameter n). In the Android system, each Android application has a unique id; its id can distinguish an application.
C. BEHAVIOR RECONSTRUCTION
The records in log files are too complicated to be understood by users; therefore, log records are reconstructed to generate behavior graphs in the proposed system. As the behavior reconstruction module is distributed on the server, the log file, and packages.list must be sent over the network to the server.
1) GRAPH GENERATING ALGORITHM
The code for the graph-generating algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, ''uid'' stands for the unique id of an Android application, ''pid''' stands for the id of a process, and ''cid'' stands for the id of a child process. Main steps of the algorithm are to create a node and add the node to the tree for each record in the log file. Therefore, the time complexity of the algorithm is O(n), where n stands for the number of records in the log file.
The details of the algorithm flow are as follows:
1) Initialize the array nodes and the hash table map.
2) Get log records from the log file one by one. If no log record remains, the system goes to Step 9. 3) Extract pid, uid, the name of the function, and parameters from each log record, and then store them in a node of behavior. If the system call is a clone call, cid also needs to be stored. 4) If a uid has been stored at map, this indicates that the node of an application has been created, and the system must go to Step 5. If the node of an application has not been created, the system goes to Step 8. 5) When pid has also been stored at map, the process tree, at which the current node is stored, has been in the graph, and the system then goes to Step 6. It goes to
Step 7 when pid is not in map. 6) If the system call is clone, insert this node(clone) after the node in map, and update map [uid] [cid] to this node(clone). For other system calls, insert this node(clone) after the node in map, and then update map [uid] [pid] to this node(clone). make it a child node of the root node. In addition, make the current behavior node a child node of the application node, and update map [uid] [pid]. 9) A primary behavior graph has been generated.
2) BROADCAST-MATCHING ALGORITHM
The primary behavior graph above still lacks readability and semantic relations. Hence, a broadcast-matching algorithm is used to improve the behavior graph. The first step is to identify the life cycles of activities in an application, and the second step is to match broadcast events. For the first step, some of the IPC functions that are detected can match the callback functions of the life cycles of activities in the Android system. For example, the IPC function startActivity can match with the callback function onStart, and the IPC function activityStopped can match with the callback function onStop. This indicates that IPC functions are able to reflect the life cycles of activities in an application correctly.
For the second step, to identify the life cycles of a broadcast, the Android system applies a broadcast mechanism to send messages about the system to applications. If an application has registered the broadcast event, it handles the event. In the Android system, there are two approaches for registering broadcast receivers. One is static registration. Receivers and actions in applications must be defined in the AndroidManifest.xml file. Whether an application is in the active state or not, it listens to receivers.
The second approach is dynamic registration, which calls functions to register in activities. An application will no longer listen to receivers if it is closed. In the process of sending a broadcast, when an application requests the function sendBroadcast, in fact, it requests the function sendBroadcast in the class ContextWrapper. Then, the function broadcastIntent is called by the class ComtextImpl, and several functions in ActivityManagerService are called to handle the broadcast.
The specific sending processes of the two methods of registering broadcast events differ. In the case of dynamic registration, the function scheduleRegisteredReceiver is called by the class BroadcastQueue, and then the function performReceive is called by the class ActivityThread. For static registration, the function scheduleReceiver is called by class BroadcastQueue, and then the broadcast is handled directly in class ActivityThread.
Finally, the two registration methods share the same process. The function onReceive is called, and then the broadcast is handled by the class that inherits the class BroadcastReceiver and rewrites the function onReceive. After handling the broadcast, the class BroadcastReceiver may call the function sendFinished, followed by the function finishReceiver. In the entire process above, the functions scheduleRegisteredReceiver, scheduleReceiver, and finishReceiver are IPC functions. By monitoring the three functions, we can correctly match the life cycles of the broadcast.
The broadcast-matching algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. As the process of handling a broadcast event is sequential, the schedule methods of the broadcast life cycle are stored in a queue. Main steps of the algorithm are to identify every node in the behavior graph and to traverse to the top from a specific behavior node. Since the number of traversed nodes in the second step, which ranges from 2 to (nodeSize-1), is uncertain, the average frequency of the second step calculated is (nodeSize+1)(nodeSize−2)/2. Therefore, the time complexity of the algorithm is O(n 2 ), where n stands for the number of behavior nodes in the behavior graph.
The detailed algorithm flow is as follows: 1) Get behavior nodes in the behavior graph serially according to the log file. If no behavior node remains, the system goes to Step 10. 2) Check whether the function of the current behavior node is a schedule method of the broadcast life cycle. If it is a schedule method of the broadcast life cycle, the system goes to Step 3; otherwise, it goes to Step 4. 3) Add the behavior node to the queue, and return to
Step 1. 4) Check whether the function of the current behavior node is the finishing method of the broadcast life cycle.
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the system goes to Step 5; otherwise, it returns to Step 1. 5) Visit the next node in the queue, and mark it as the node of the queue. If all nodes in the queue have been visited, the system returns to Step 1. 6) Check whether the function of the current behavior matches the function of the node of the queue. If they are matched, the system goes to Step 7; otherwise, it returns to Step 5. 7) In the primitive behavior graph, traverse to the top from the current behavior node that is the node of the finishing method of the broadcast life cycle. During the traversal, ensure that the times of occurrence in the log file of visited nodes are later than those of the current behavior node. 8) When the traversal finishes, make the node where the traversal stops the first function of the broadcast life cycle, and also make the current node the last function of the broadcast life cycle. At the same time, make the two nodes the children of the node of the schedule method of the broadcast life cycle. 9) Remove the queued node from the queue, and return to
Step 1. 10) The broadcast-matching algorithm is completed, and a behavior graph with abundant semantic information has been generated.
3) GRAPH-SIMPLIFYING ALGORITHM
The behavior graph generated above still contains redundant information and needs to be simplified. First, the redundant nodes of clones without children should be removed. Second, duplicate nodes that are continuously called are combined into one node, and the number of repetitions is marked. Finally, in this system, each broadcast life cycle can be abstracted into a node, which will contain abstract behavior information. There are three types of nodes after abstraction, as follows:
1) File operations, including the ''open'' system call, ''write'' system call, ''read'' system call, and ''close'' system call, are classified as File Access. 2) Network operations, including the ''sendto'' and ''recvfrom'' system calls, are classified as Network Access.
3) The third type contains IPC calls, but they are too numerous to arrange. Therefore, the authority mechanism of the Android system is used. In the Android system, the permissions of an application are checked if one of the key APIs is called. For example, the system checks whether the application owns android.permission. SEND_SMS permission if a message is sent. In practice, permission checking is completed through the function checkPermission in the class ActivityManager, and the checked permission is added to the abstract node as abstract information.
D. STATIC APPLICATION ANALYSIS
The server receives the APK of an Android application from the client and analyzes it to extract permissions and APIs [25] . In this system, APKTool, which is a decompiler provided by Google, is used to decompile APKs. The tool generates files such as source codes, a configuration file, and resources.
In the Android system, permissions must be declared before being used in Android applications. Hence, to obtain permissions, AndroidManifest.xml, which is the configuration file, needs to be traversed.
Decompiling results in several smali folders, which contain the codes of an application in the form of a smali file [11] [29] . In fact, although Android applications are developed using the Java language, the Android system owns the Dalvik VM itself. Therefore, the codes in Android applications are compiled by smali instead of a class of Java. All smali files are traversed, and every line starting with ''invoke,'' which represents a function call, is extracted. Then, the extracted line is parsed to obtain the APIs. Finally, to run APKTool [18] in a Java program, we execute commands of CMD by obtaining the runtime environment.
E. APPLICATION STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS
During the preparation phase, massive samples of Android applications were essential. As it was unrealistic to download all of the applications manually, benign applications were achieved by means of a Web crawler from the Android Market, and malware applications were downloaded from several forums such as the Kafan and phpBB forums. For this system, it was sufficient to use a simple Web crawler program to grab information from the Internet automatically.
The statistics of the permissions and APIs are required. Permissions are considered as an example in this paper. The first step is to calculate the sums of permissions. Thus, for each permission, four numbers need to be calculated: the number of malware applications using the permission, the number of benign applications using the permission, the number of malware applications not using the permission, and the number of benign applications not using the permission. This is the process of collecting the statistics of permissions, as well as of APIs.
The second step is to analyze the permissions and obtain characteristic attributes. In this system, a chi-square test is applied to determine whether the presence of a permission and the nature of an application owning the permission are related. For the algorithm, the chi-square values can be calculated by using the formula for four-fold tables. In the formula, a stands for the number of malware applications using the permission, b stands for the number of benign applications using the permission, c stands for the number of malware applications not using the permission, d stands for the number of benign applications using the permission, and n stands for the number of applications. In the special case where the value of a, b, c, or d is less than 5 and that of n is greater than 40, the correction formula
is required. In addition,
is used under normal conditions. A chi-square test tests permissions other than those that are used fewer than 50 times. The larger the chi-square value, the larger the correlation between the presence of permission and the nature of an application owning the permission. Hence, permissions are ordered according to chi-square values, and the first 80 are defined as characteristic attributes.
The last step is to train the classifier [17] with the characteristic attributes above. In this system, a naive Bayes classification algorithm is applied to identify applications. To obtain the probability of occurrence of a category, the conditional probabilities of characteristic attributes, which are parts of an item to be classified, must be calculated. Therefore, in this section, we calculate the conditional probabilities of the characteristic attributes. Using the data in the database, we can determine the probability of malware applications with a certain characteristic attribute, probability of malware applications without a certain characteristic attribute, the probability of benign applications with a certain characteristic attribute, and the probability of benign applications without a certain characteristic attribute.
F. MALWARE APPLICATION IDENTIFICATION
In this module, a classifier using the naive Bayes classification algorithm is implemented to identify whether an application is malware or benign. First, the server receives the APK and the log file of an application from the client. Then, the APK is parsed according to Section III.D. In addition, since the static analysis of APKs suffers the problem of a lack of dynamic codes, we also extract the permissions and APIs recorded by dynamic behavior detection from the log file. Then, using the probabilities from before, the probability of the application being malware can be determined, as well as the probability of the application being benign. Finally, the two probabilities are compared, and the application is identified.
Finally, to interpret the identification results, our system traverses the behavior graph generated from dynamic behavior detection and reconstruction and searches for malicious behaviors to present them. In this study, we focused on file operations, network operations, and IPC calls. The steps to locate malicious behaviors are as follows:
1) Obtain the root node of the complete behavior graph and traverse its children. 2) If the information of the node is related to the system calls required, go to Step 3; otherwise, go to Step 4. 3) Behaviors must be stored in arrays. If the array has not been created, it must be created, and then the node must be added to the array. When the array already exists, the node is simply added to the array. Then, traverse the children of the node, and go to Step 2. Specifically, if the node does not have children, the behavior is considered to be finished. 4) If the array exists, the behavior is considered to be finished; otherwise, traverse the children of the node, and go to Step 2.
If an application is identified as a malware application, perform the above operations. All of the behaviors we obtain are likely to be malicious behaviors.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we present an evaluation of our system. The evaluation process addressed two aspects. One aspect was the usability of the system, which was evaluated through the behavior analysis of applications and the overhead that the dynamic analysis incurs in the Android system. The second aspect was the accuracy of the system, which was evaluated through the accuracy of static analysis on the server. The processes of the experiments were based on the Android simulator Galaxy Nexus, with the Linux kernel Goldfish 3.4.0 and Android system 4.4.2.
A. EVALUATION OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
In the experiment to evaluate the behavior analysis, GGTracker, a malware application from a research community, was chosen for analysis. GGTracker is a new type of Trojan located on a Trojan Website, which is similar to Android Market and is likely to be downloaded to Android devices by users. The objective of GGTracker is to subscribe a device to fee-based services without the user being aware. After starting the detection process, we launched GGTracker and triggered many types of events manually to record dynamic behaviors. Through the behavior analysis of GGTracker, we observe that GGTracker has two main malicious behaviors. The first malicious behavior is shown in Fig. 2 . The first time that GGTracker is started, it fetches the user's phone number and relevant information and records them in a particular xml file. Then, it sends the relevant information to a remote server, ggtrack.org, which forces the user's device to subscribe to a fee-based service. In addition, the IP address and port of the remote server shown in the behavior graph are 52.28.3.6:80. Finally, GGTracker registers a broadcast to receive messages to listen to the messages received. Under normal circumstances, in fact, if users decide to subscribe to a service by using messages, the service provider sends a message to the users to confirm the fees. After receiving the message, users need to respond with specific content such as ''Confirm'' or ''Y.'' However, GGTracker is able to subscribe to fee-based services without the user being aware, as it intercepts and listens to messages.
The second malicious behavior is the interception of messages, which is presented in Fig. 3 . When a mobile device has received a message, GGTracker intercepts the message and parses it. The analysis of behaviors showed that GGTracker intercepts messages sent from phone numbers, including 99735, 46621, 96512, 33335, 00033335, 00036397, 36397, 55991, 55999, 56255, and 41001. Then, GGTracker sends the message to a remote server, the domain name of which is www.amaz0n-cloud.com. In particular, GGTracker may reply to the message sent by phone number 41001 with ''Yes.''
B. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE
In the case of dynamic detection, we evaluated the performance when our system was run on Android devices. Two custom test schemes were applied. One was applied to test the upper limit on the performance overhead of parsing system calls, which include mainly ioctl system calls and file system calls. The second scheme tested the performance overhead in an actual operation process. We tested the start-up time of applications to evaluate their performance overhead, as applications are disturbed less during this time. In addition, during the start-up time, operations including ActivityManager analysis, interprocess communication, display of graphical interfaces, and behaviors in the life cycle of onCreate() are executed. For the first performance test, a program was designed to request multiple file operations or IPC calls repeatedly, and then record the execution time to test the upper limit of the performance overhead. Table 1 shows that the percentage of the overhead of file operations is 17%, and that of the overhead of parsing IPC calls is 18%. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, as compared with previous methods, our proposed method increases the burden on the Android system only slightly. In the second test process, an Android Debug Bridge (ADB) instruction was used to test the start-up time of Android applications.
To avoid interference, we tested the start-up time of each application 10 times and then calculated the average time. Ultimately, 16 different applications were tested, of which 14 were provided by the system, and 2 were installed manually. The behaviors of applications in the startup process differ, and therefore their overheads are not the same. According to the results, the performance overhead of the start-up process ranges from 0.20% to 10.67%, and the average start-up time increases by 5.25% with dynamic analysis.
C. EVALUATION OF MALWARE APPLICATION IDENTIFICATION
We evaluated the results of the malware application identification. After being downloaded, 122 malware applications and 166 benign applications were available for testing. We traversed all applications to test them in our system one by one, to get the results of the identification process. Fig. 4 . presents the results of our experiment. As we focused on identifying malware application, we confirmed malware application as the positive class. In the experiment, 104 malware applications and 150 benign applications can be accurately identified. After being calculated, the accuracy of the malware application identification is 88.2%. We can also obtain the results that the precision of the malware application identification is 86.7% and the recall of the malware application identification is 85.2%. With the results of our experiment above, this identification method is proved to be effective. 
V. RELATED WORK A. STATIC ANALYSIS
Static analysis extracts information required by means of analyzing source codes or binary files. It analyzes and covers all codes rather than executing the application, and therefore its code coverage is high. However, the method lacks practical execution paths and relevant contextual information [2] . Moreover, it is faced with the challenges of code obfuscation and dynamic code loading.
As compared with most static analysis methods, including RiskRanker [9] , our static analysis method extracts all of the permissions and APIs and then analyzes them using statistics, instead of looking up sensitive or dangerous codes. Furthermore, we use permissions and APIs from the APK and the results of dynamic detection to solve the problem of dynamic code loading.
B. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Dynamic analysis is performed by observing the behaviors of applications while they are running by executing them. It is able to avoid the problems of code obfuscation and dynamic code loading. Dynamic analysis based on a Dalvik VM is widely used for taint analysis. TaintDroid [6] , which performs taint tracking by modifying the Dalvik VM, was the original dynamic taint analysis method. Based on TaintDroid, several researchers proposed different methods [18] , [26] . However, all of these methods have the same shortcoming: it is difficult to analyze native codes. Thus, to solve the problem, VMI-based research studies were presented. For example, DroidScope [22] runs the entire Android system on a QEMU VM in order to seamlessly reconstruct the semantics of the OS and the Java layer. These approaches need to be run in a simulated environment, and it is unlikely that they will be ported to real devices. They are unable to obtain real behaviors of applications and are faced with problems such as anti-forensic techniques.
In this paper, we propose a new method of dynamic analysis based on a kernel to detect the behaviors of applications. As compared with the approaches above, the most important unique characteristic of our method is that it can be used in real devices to yield reliable results. Furthermore, our method uses kernel-level monitoring mechanisms in order to monitor both Java codes and native codes, while dynamic analysis based on a Dalvik VM is unable to achieve this.
In addition, malware cannot find our method, and thus avoid detection, because our method runs at the kernel level and owns the highest-level permission, whereas most applications can own only lower-level permissions. Although Jarvis also operates in the Linux kernel, its main goal is to bridge the semantic gap between high-level Android APIs and low-level system calls, not to analyze application behaviors. In addition, our method transforms the detection results into a behavior graph, and thus, users can understand the analysis results more easily.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the study described in this paper, we implemented a system of real-time behavior analysis and identification for Android applications. The system can be improved to enhance security and accuracy in the future. Firstly, the process of identification is completed through the network, and thus it is faced with severe security issues [4] , [5] , [10] , [21] such as information leakage. In the future, we can create an effective algorithm to select the best relay to assist the secure transmission like [7] , [8] . Moreover, we can ensure the transmission security by implementing data encryption and decryption. To improve the system performance, we can also apply cache techniques [20] . If the identification results are pre-stored at the relay nodes around the user, the data transmission will be directly performed from the relays to the user, instead of experiencing the identification process again. Thus, it is an effective way to reduce the transmission load and to speed up the transmission of identification results. Considering that a large number of users are likely to identify applications at the same time, we had better improve cahce techniques [13] to deal with such a situation. However, outdated channel state information (CSI) [13] may be a tricky problem for us.
Secondly, the limitations of the dynamic analysis method in our system are essentially the same as those of traditional dynamic analysis methods. On the one hand, dynamic analysis methods usually utilize custom automated tools to trigger events, or the users themselves trigger events. Thus, it takes a long time to analyze a large number of applications. On the other hand, there are many logic branches in an application, and this is likely to give rise to a path explosion problem. In addition, our system is designed mainly for Android system 4.4.2 and is unable to deal with parts of services automatically. Therefore, our system may be improved to enhance the accuracy in the future as follows: 1) We should attempt to apply the corresponding AIDL files in different Android systems to help the parsing binder.
2) The dynamic analysis should be able to extract bound services from the Android system automatically, and automatically analyze these services to provide information for the parsing binder. 3) We can combine static analysis and dynamic analysis to generate more comprehensive graphs. 
